

3
ORIGINAL LETTERS

FROM

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

K
SIR EYRE COOTE, K. B.

AND

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

TO

SIR THOMAS RUMBOLD, BART.

AND

LORD MACARTNEY, K. B.

L O N D O N:

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ORIGINAL LETTERS.

*Copy of a Letter from WARREN HASTINGS,
Esq. to Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. at Madras.*

FORT WILLIAM,
20th January 1779.

DEAR SIR,

IT will be difficult to give you the history of our late political transactions, though comprising a single subject, without taking it up from a very early period, and entering into a long detail. I will, however, endeavour to relate it in as brief a manner as possible, and confine it to such particulars as are essentially necessary to give you a proper understanding of our present state.

The treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, on the part of this Government with the Mahratta State, was executed on the 1st March, 1776; on their part it was authenticated by the seal of the Pishwa, an infant of about three years

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old, and the signatures of his two Ministers, Succuram Baboo and Nanna Furneefs. By one article of it, a provision was made for the subsistence of Raganaut Row, their late competitor, on condition of his residing in the heart of the Mahratta dominions with a guard, appointed by the Ministers themselves, for his state and security. This clause, of course, defeated the intention of the treaty, as it left Raganaut Row at the mercy of his enemies, without any pledge or engagement for his safety. The consequence was such as might have been expected from it.

Raganaut Row fled to Bombay, and has ever since continued under the protection of that Presidency. The Ministers exclaimed against this proceeding as a breach of the treaty — of the spirit it certainly was, but not of the letter. They, on their part, were not more observant of the former.

About the month of May 1777, the Chevalier de St. Lubin* made his appearance

* “ This St. Lubin is a most perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated even the Ministry of France in this business.” *Vide Mr. W. G. Farmer’s letter to the President of Bombay, dated 1st Nov. 1777, from Poona.*

at Poonah, in the public character of a Minister from the Court of France : — He was received with great honour, and we were soon after informed of written engagements mutually interchanged between him and Nanna Furnees; by which he promised, to bring a regiment of Europeans with military stores to Poonah, for the service of the Mahratta State; this intelligence has been since confirmed by authorities of unquestionable credit, and by a series of facts of public notoriety*.

It had been always my opinion, that this was the only way by which the French could entertain a rational hope of regaining their consequence in India, or of affecting ours; and I expected, that the Presidency of Bombay, which was more immediately interested in the effects of such a connection, would take some early and effectual means to render it abortive. This appeared by no means difficult; the Mahratta army, under Hurry Punt Furkia, was at that

* These *notorious facts* have never happened. St. Lubin was a low adventurer in India; perhaps a spy of the French Government. The Mahrattas soon dismissed him from Poonah; entered into no engagements with him whatever. For the purpose of going to war, all pretences were thought plausible. *Vide Appendix to 6th Report, Committee of Secresy, No. 22, and No. 155.*

time engaged in an unequal war with Hyder Ally; and the Ministers, divided among themselves, possessed little authority, and were in a manner dependant for that little on their vassals. The Presidency of Bombay had long shewn an *impatience* to revive the cause of Raganaut Row; and the slightest movement made by them in his favour, would have proved sufficient to overthrow the feeble power which they had to contend with, and to establish their own influence in the Mahratta State on its ruin*.

I was not deceived in my expectation. On the 29th of January 1778, we received a letter from the Presidency and Council of Bombay, dated the 12th December 1777, informing us, that a proposal had been secretly made to them, by a party which had been formed against Nanna Furneefs, consisting of Succurum Baboo, Moraba Furneefs, the nephew of Nanna Furneefs, Butchaba Poorunder, and Fuckeefee Holkar, to assist them in the design of replacing Raganaut in the chief administration of the Mahratta State; and that *they* had agreed to join in

* In December 1778, the Presidency of Bombay made the attempt with nearly the whole of their military force. On the 16th of January 1779, their whole army surrendered at discretion to the Mahrattas.

it, requiring only, as a preliminary condition, a written application to the same effect under the hands and seals of the confederates*. They excused themselves for having so far engaged in the design without our previous authority, by the obvious necessity of an immediate decision, and requested our acquiescence and assistance in it.

On receipt of their letter, it was *instantly* proposed † and resolved to ratify what they had done; to authorise them to proceed; and to send them an extraordinary supply of ten lacks of rupees, for the expence of the undertaking, with a promise of a military force to support them in the execution of it.

On the 21st of January 1778, orders were issued for forming a detachment, consisting of six battalions of sepoys; one company of native artillery, with the regular proportion of

* The Presidency of Bombay, in a subsequent letter, dated 20th January, 1778, informed Mr. Hastings, that the overtures made by the ministerial Chiefs had produced no effect; and that they (the Presidency of Bombay) had *immediately resolved that nothing could be done*, unless Succurum Baboo joined in the application, *which he never did*

† By Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, against the protest of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler,

field

field artillery; to which were afterwards added, a regiment of cavalry and a body of 500 Candahar horse belonging to the service of the Nabob of Oude, and supplied by him on the occasion. The command was given to Colonel Leslie, who had instructions to march directly to Bombay, by such routs as he should judge most practicable; and that of *Berar* was preferably recommended, on account of the good understanding which had long subsisted between that Government and ours. For the sequel of his operations, he was directed to obey the orders of the President and Council of Bombay.

The novelty of the service, and the habits of long inaction, joined to other causes, made it very late before the detachment could be completely formed and equipped.

About the latter end of May, it crossed the Jumna with some opposition, and that very slight and ineffectual, from Ballajee, the Chief of the Mahratta territories, dependant on Calpee.

In the mean time, the design which had furnished the occasion of this expedition was suffered to sleep at Bombay, the persevering ar-
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dour of that Presidency for the cause of Ragnaut Row ceasing with the removal of the bar which had been put on the prosecution of it. It produced, however, the principal effect intended by the promoters of it. These, suddenly assembling their forces, all together amounting, by estimation, to no more than thirty thousand men, took possession of the city of Poonah, deprived Nanna Furneess of his authority, and invested Moraba Furneess with it in his stead. — This easy revolution, effected without bloodshed or contest, proved the extreme weakness of the Mahratta Government at this crisis*; and the greater facility with which the plan offered to the Presidency of Bombay might have been executed in its full extent, had they chosen to have engaged in it. In this catastrophe they had no part; nor have they since availed themselves of the continued state of distraction which has prevailed, and still prevails, at Poonah, though in a less apparent degree, at present.

I feel the ingratitude and injustice of this conduct; but I shall make no other comment upon it.

The

* That one party in a State should dispossess another, is no proof of weakness in that State. The moment they were invaded

The first use which they made of the authority given them over Colonel Leslie, was to order him to suspend his march, assigning no better reasons for this procedure than the expence and hazard of the expedition, which were our concern, not theirs; and the opposition given to the original measure by two of their members against a majority of all the rest of the Council.

This order was followed, in a few days after, by another, and by others successively since that, to prosecute the march, but without any object described, or plan of operations proposed or thought of.

Thus abandoned by the Presidency of Bombay, we had recourse to other means, which were more within the compass of our own direction, and for which a provision had, in some degree, been made a considerable time before, on the presumption of the utility of which it might eventually prove in the case of a rupture with the Mahrattas.

As soon as it was resolved to send the detachment to the other side of India, I applied to

vaded by their common enemy, the English, they united and beat us.

Moodajee

Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, to grant the permission for its free march through his territories, with such assistance as it might require in the way. I had good reason to expect his ready compliance. I was not disappointed. He returned an immediate answer to my letters, in terms such as I could wish, and at the same time sent a person of trust to the banks of the Nerbudda, which bounds his dominions on the north, with a store of grain for the subsistence of the detachment, and orders to attend it through his country, of which he at the same time advised Colonel Leslie, inviting him to take that route, and assuring him of the most friendly reception.

I am obliged to omit many particulars for fear of swelling this narrative to too great a size, and to confine myself to such facts and circumstances as are essentially necessary to the connection: the rest I hope soon to have an opportunity of communicating to you at large in person.

The sovereignty of the Mahratta State is, by its constitution, vested in a Rajah; but for many years past, that is, since the accession of the late Rajah, the powers of it have been usurped by the Minister of the Rajah, who is

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stiled the Pishwa, the Rajah possessing only the name. The last Rajah was called Rajah Ram Raja: he died about the latter end of December, 1777. He had no children; nor have I heard certainly that any successor has been named. Moodajee Boosla has the fairest pretensions, being in the direct lineal descent from the ancient stock, and the adopted son of Sâhoo Raja, the predecessor of Ram Raja, though deprived of his right by the artifices of Balajee, who was the Pishwa when Sâhoo Raja died; and, by an accommodation with Ragoonjee Boosla, the father of Moodajee, which was confined to a bare sufferance of Ram Raja's elevation, without any acknowledgement of it, he and his sons, as Moodajee does to this day, stiling themselves, in all public acts, the subjects of Rajah Sâhoo.

I had an early knowledge of Moodajee's pretensions, and judged him therefore a fit instrument to supply the place of Raganaut Row, in the plan offered to us by the Presidency of Bombay. He had wealth, power, a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almost to Poonah; Raganaut Row neither wealth, power, nor territory, nor an influence remaining which could supply the want of these requisites, except what might eventually arise from

from an active part taken by the Presidency of Bombay in his favour; and they had plainly shewn that they would take none. The only point wanting was to fix Moodajee a party in the design. I expected him to make advances, having sent back his vakeel to him for that purpose, a man of understanding, and well instructed; but it soon became necessary to take a more determined and active part.

On the 7th of July 1778, advices were received from Cairo, and seemed to be of certain credit, that war had been declared between Great Britain and France. It was almost immediately proposed and resolved * to enter into a negotiation with Moodajee Boosla, on the grounds which I have mentioned above. Mr. Elliot was deputed on this service, and set out on the 19th of July. Mr. Rumbold has a copy of his instructions, and I have desired him to give you the perusal of them. The whole service could not have furnished an agent equally qualified for such a commission, and my hopes of its success were proportionably raised; but these were

* By Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell.

Quere. Was this a proper time to engage in a war with the Mahratta empire?

suddenly blasted, and the whole project *annihilated* by the death of that excellent young man.

I must now return to Colonel Leslie. The distance from Calpee to the river Narbudda is about 140 coss. The only natural difficulties which he had to encounter, were such as might arise from the heats, which are excessive in the dry season. All other impediments had been removed by early applications to the petty Chiefs, whose territories lie in the road, and the most pacific assurances given by them in return. This precaution was indeed more necessary to the credit of the expedition than to its success, since the whole force which the country could furnish, if combined, was not likely to retard it; nor was it the interest of any to attempt it, unless forced to it by extreme provocation.

Unfortunately Colonel Leslie suffered himself to be drawn into a party, in the domestic dissensions of the Rajah of Bundelcund, and lingered with the detachment under various pretences in that country, till at length the Board found themselves under the necessity of recalling him from the command. The order passed on the 7th of October 1778; and on the 19th news arrived of his death, which happened on the

the 3d of the same month, at Rajah Gur, at the distance in space of about sixty coss from Calpee, and in time of exactly four months from the day on which he began his march from that place.

By such events have all our views been disappointed in the very points on which we had placed our principal dependance; — events which no human prudence could have foreseen or prevented; but for which I must still expect to receive the censures which the world always passes on unsuccessful measures.

We had no right to suspect that the Presidency of Bombay would abandon us * in a project which they themselves had formed, and taken such uncommon pains to engage our participation in it. We had no interest in it, either personal or public †, except in its remote consequences. It was formed without our sanction, and its execution intended to precede our knowledge of it ‡. Unacquainted with the

* They told Mr. Hastings, in their letter of the 20th of January 1778, that *nothing could be done*.

† Then why engage in a project in which there was no public interest?

‡ Mr. Hastings gave his sanction to the project, and promised to support it, as soon as he heard of it.

characters

characters of Mr. Hornbey and the members who composed the Council, except General Carnac, who, I think, would have acted a very different part had he had the lead, we could only judge what they were likely to do by what they had done; and concluding, that as they had hitherto manifested an impatience for the support of the cause of Ragoba, which *the obligation of the treaty* and the authority of this Government had been scarcely able to restrain, they would be at least as zealous in the prosecution of it when those restraints were removed: it could be no impeachment of our foresight that we were deceived in so reasonable an expectation.

My hopes in Colonel Leslie were as well grounded. He had the reputation of being an active and experienced officer. I had endeavoured to attach him to me by the strongest personal ties. His instructions prescribed the line of his conduct in terms which he could not misunderstand: they expressly warned him against the very temptations by which he suffered himself to be seduced; and the real objects * of his command were such as would have gratified *the most elevated ambition!*

* *Quere.* What were these real objects?

I am

I am indebted to Colonel Goddard for having redeemed my character from the consequences of Colonel Leslie's delays, by shewing that the impediments of his march were either ideal, or such as he himself had created, and that they would vanish of themselves on a different conduct presented to them *. Mr. Elliot's death was a stroke of Providence, for which I could have made no provision, and left me no other resource but in the desire, which I had endeavoured to excite in the Rajah of Berar, to take a leading part in the negotiation.

These disappointments, though mortifying and hurtful as I know they must be to my private credit, have not hitherto produced any other ill effects of a public nature, than in the fruitless expence which has attended Colonel Leslie's delays; possibly they may prove, in the event, the means (Elliot's death excepted, which is an irretrievable loss) of yielding more solid and lasting advantages to the Company,

* The impediments to Colonel Leslie's march were, first, the violent heats of June, and then the violent rains of July, August, and September. When both were over, Colonel Goddard marched; and he arrived at Surat, because he met with little opposition in the first part of his march, and none at all in the latter.

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and to the British nation, than any which we could have derived from an uninterrupted prosecution of the first design.

Knowing that Moodajee Boosla must have received much earlier intelligence of the death of Mr. Elliot than myself, I thought it advisable to defer taking any step towards renewing the negotiation, until I could learn from him what effect that event had produced on his mind. He was no sooner informed of it, than he wrote to me in the most pressing terms, to transfer the powers with which Mr. Elliot had been invested to his Secretary, that no time might be lost, and to depute another person from hence. On the receipt of Moodajee's letter, the Board* resolved to transmit Mr. Elliot's instructions to Colonel Goddard, with full powers to carry them into execution, and to conclude the treaty, offensive and defensive with the Government of Berar.

During the state of uncertainty in which Moodajee remained until he could be advised of the commission sent to Colonel Goddard, leisure was afforded to the vacceels of the

* Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell.

Pishwa and of Nizam Ally Cawn, to work upon his mind, and alarm him with menaces from their masters. At this critical period of suspense, and while the detachment was still at a distance, he fell dangerously ill, and it is not surprising that, in such a situation, he should be indecisive and irresolute. It is to these circumstances I attribute a letter, which he wrote to Colonel Goddard in a state of despondency, and *apparently* declining to enter into any negotiation with us, or to co-operate with our detachment;—but having in some degree recovered his health, and been informed by Colonel Goddard of his having received powers to continue the negotiations, and of his intention to send a gentleman properly qualified to open the subject of his instructions, and learn the Rajah's sentiments upon them; Moodajee in his answers, a copy of which I transmit for your information, has again shewn a disposition to unite with us. From the impatience, which he expresses, for the arrival of the gentleman deputed by Colonel Goddard, I draw the most favourable expectations.

You will please to recollect, Sir, that this expedition was undertaken at the repeated instances of the Presidency of Bombay for the purpose of defeating the dangerous designs,

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which

which the French were meditating by their agent St. Lubin at Poonah. But we had no sooner engaged in it, and shewn our determination to support the plan, which they recommended, than they totally deserted us, and even suggested obstacles to the execution of a plan, which they themselves had framed.

Finding that no reliance was to be placed on assistance from Bombay, I was compelled to adopt means more within my own control, and which might effect the desired purposes without depending on that government.

Incredible as it may appear to you, Colonel Goddard, in a public letter of the 5th December 1778, informs us, that he has not received any letter from Bombay of a later date than the 21st July; although he had constantly advised them of his progress; nor has this Government received any advices from thence of a later date than the 11th of September, although, by private intelligence which I can rely upon, I am informed that some vigorous measures for the re-establishment of Raganaut Row were in agitation. These will not affect Colonel Goddard's operations, if he shall have concluded a treaty with Moodajee Boosla, which will *of course* take precedence of any plan

plan formed by the Presidency of Bombay *, if they cannot be made to coincide.

I forbear at this time to speak of the measures, which it may become necessary to pursue in the event of a failure of Colonel Goddard's negotiation, because I think it very improbable, that Moodajee should be so blind to his own interest, and even to his present safety, as to suffer such advantages to escape him, as are presented to him in the proposed alliance, and to expose himself to the resentment of the Ministers of Poonah, and of Nizam Ally Cawn, which he must expect as the infallible consequences of his separation from us, after the *notorious proofs*, which he has offered, of his inclination to engage with us in an opposition to them †. His determination must have

* Supposing the India Company's faith to have been pledged, as it was, to Raganaut Row, by Bombay, it does not appear why such engagement should *of course* be superseded by the subsequent pledge of the same faith to Moodajee Boosla. To one of these persons there must be a breach of faith, if not to both.

† In spite of all these beautiful speculations, Moodajee Boosla joined in the confederacy against us, and marched an army to the frontiers of Bengal, in June 1780, which Mr. Hastings was obliged to buy off with 300,000*l.* of the Company's money. Such was the event of his boasted union with Moodajee Boosla!

been taken long before this ; and I am in daily expectation of receiving the notification of it ; as Mr. Watherston, the gentleman who is deputed by Colonel Goddard to his court, was within two days journey of Naugpoor on the 17th of December.

I, for my own part, have not the least doubt of the detachment reaching Bombay with ease, even without this support, under the same active and able conduct which Colonel Goddard has displayed since he has received the command of it ; nor of his being joined with many partizans of Raganaut Row, who wait but for a safe occasion to declare themselves, should it be necessary to recur to the original object of the expedition ; but I shall reserve this for the subject of another letter, should it be necessary to pursue it.

As I have professed to give you a plain and concise narrative of the facts, I will not discredit the measure, to which they all bear a common relation, by any comment upon them, trusting to your good sense *, and to the zeal which you have hitherto so successfully exerted

* Mr. Hastings did not think it safe to trust *entirely* to Sir Eyre Coote's good sense on this occasion.

for the aggrandizement of the British dominions
in India, for my best security against any at-
tempts which may have been made to influ-
ence your judgement against it.

I have the honour to be,

With much esteem,

DEAR SIR,

Your most obedient,

Faithful servant,

(Signed)

WARREN HASTINGS.

Extract

*Extract of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS to Sir
THOMAS RUMBOLD, dated Fort William,
28th July 1779.*

IF I have not been so communicative of the views and measures of this Government, since my letter of the 27th of February, it is owing to the want of materials. The miserable end of the ill-projected enterprize of the Presidency of Bombay has blasted all the hopes of this Government, and left us *no resource, but in the offer of peace on honourable terms.* This we intrusted to Colonel Goddard on the first news of the convention of Wargawm in April last, empowering him to confirm the treaty of Poo-rundur, provided the Ministers would make a formal renunciation of the rights, which they supposed themselves to derive from the convention of Wargawm, and engage never to admit the French either on the footing of trade or alliance into their dominions. On the 14th of June we sent him other instructions, chiefly relating to the measures which we thought proper to be pursued, in the event of a war. Of these I will send you a copy, and as soon as it is determined what new line of conduct we

we shall follow on the occasion of Ragoba's escape to our camp, I will give you immediate advice of it. I think it most probable that the Ministers will be glad to yield to any terms, rather than risque another war in the present distracted state of their affairs, and the unequal contest they have to sustain with the single power of Hyder. I have conformed to what I believe will be the general wish, in giving my support to the plan of a peaceable accommodation, *I own, against my own feelings, and wishes,* and the knowledge which I think I possess of the consequences which our influence will suffer in India, if we do not, by some signal act, retrieve the disgrace which our arms have suffered by the misconduct of the late expedition from Bombay. The whole Indian world judges as your friend Dowla judges, that our miscarriage was not owing to misconduct or timidity, but to the inequality of our infantry to their numerous cavalry. *I shall not in my heart be sorry,* if they force us into a situation, which may afford us the occasion of refuting this opinion, which I am certain will be the case, if our forces are *properly employed* and well conducted. We shall apply to you for your assistance, and immediately. We shall also strengthen General Goddard with reinforcements

inforcements from our own establishments, and possess great political resources, if we are called upon to employ them:

I have the honour to be, &c.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Note. “ In this letter Mr. Hastings declares
 “ that *no resource was left him but in the offer*
 “ *of peace*;—yet the offer was against his own
 “ feelings and *wishes*, and he should not, *in his*
 “ heart, be sorry that the offer was rejected
 “ by the Mahrattas.”

Copy

*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE to Sir
THOMAS RUMBOLD; dated Lucknow, 27th
January 1780.*

MY DEAR SIR THOMAS,

THOUGH I approve your intention of returning to Europe as soon as possible, yet I cannot but lament the necessity you are under of doing so, both on behalf of the public and myself,

I agree with you entirely as to what our conduct ought to be in respect to the Mahrattas, and have, in the strongest terms, both to Goddard and at the Board, urged the expediency, nay the necessity of concluding a peace with them, if it could be done upon terms worthy of us; and I am now more convinced than ever, that it might have been properly effected *had not Mr. Hastings's correspondence with Goddard spoke a very different language;* and with what view this additional weight is brought upon our shoulders, while affairs wear so threatening an aspect at home, I own I cannot divine; but so it is, and we now breathe nothing but hostilities against all the great powers

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ers in India, who will certainly be supported by the French, and very possibly by the Spaniards also. What condition we are in to warrant such proceedings, you may judge, when I assure you our treasury is so exhausted that we shall soon be obliged to take up money to answer the common exigencies of Government ; and the country already so plundered and impoverished, that the revenues are sunk nearly one half, and that collected with the greatest difficulty.

Whatever gloss the Board, in its correspondence with the people at home, may put upon these matters, assure yourself such is the true state of the case.

I have already informed you of my having told Mr. Hastings, upon my arrival here, that I would certainly give my support to Government as long as his measures were such as I could join in ; and, while I continued upon the spot, he was held within proper bounds, by the conviction he felt that his credit and consequence could not exist without it. But no sooner did I quit the Presidency to attend to the business of my own particular department, which it was absolutely necessary to do in these distant stations

tions *than he has broke out into the most wanton exertions of power against the public good*, and tries every means, by private insinuations and letters through third hands, to lower my consequence among the country powers here, and embroil me with the army. In proof of the first, I enclose you a treaty* he has entered into with a man so insignificant, as to render the terms in which it is clothed *scandalous* for such a nation as ourselves to condescend to, together with my letter to the Board and protest against it, as well as private letters upon the subject. The protest and letter are withheld from the Board† under pretence, you see, of conciliating matters, and the terms required from me, are to drop my objections, which are made from conviction and feeling for the public service. As it could not be expected such a point was to be gained from me, I conclude other purposes are to be served by it; one perhaps may be the dispatch of the ships without having my dissent appear upon the proceedings; and another, I am assured,

* Ranna of Gohud.

† They were not laid before the Board until the 14th February 1780. *Vide Appendix to the sixth Report of Secret Committee, No. 239.*

is the idea of getting over Messrs. Francis and Wheler, but more especially the latter, for which purpose overtures have, I am told, been made, and lures held out, which might not succeed so well, if my dissent from this measure of Government was previously known.

If this plan succeeds, and the same principles of Government subsist, you see what must be my situation, how totally useless to the purposes which I came out to serve, and how vexatious to myself. Besides the anxiety and uneasiness I suffer from *these ruinous public, and jesuitical private proceedings*, at a time, when nothing but unanimity can save us from the evils *we have brought upon ourselves*, I have also another serious matter of complaint against those, who ought to have supported me from home, since both Minister and the Directors have failed in the promise made me that I should be placed in my proper seat at the Board the very first time any India matters were brought before the House. Lord North assured me it should be done, and the Chairman pledged himself to see it performed; and, without a confidence in those declarations I most certainly had not come out; yet a bill for prolonging the term of the act has passed without any notice being taken of it.

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I considered this as so essential a point, that I even represented to His Majesty the impropriety there would be in my sitting as youngest of the Board, when holding the rank I did in his service, and possessing his commission as Commander in Chief; and that as no example of the kind had yet been seen, it would be very extraordinary if the first instance of it should fall upon a man who was also the first to hold such powers from himself in India.

The long experience I have had of your friendship induces me thus to trouble you with my affairs; and, in consequence of your very kind offers of service, I shall request the favour of you to represent these circumstances, and my situation in consequence of them, to the Minister, and to employ the reasons I have given you for desiring it in forwarding the recall, for which I mean to write by this opportunity. You will also be so good, when

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and as I make no doubt he will, from this opening, have the goodness to give you an opportunity of entering farther into the subject,
you

you will then take the trouble of enlarging upon it, and explain to him the insuperable difficulties I must meet with when thus opposed here, and unattended to from home, in carrying on service, and fulfilling the duties expected from me — a character at stake, and, in that, what is equally valuable to me,

* * * * *

I have

I have wrote to Mr. Purling, and shall inclose it, together with my letter to the Secretary at War, in this packet; but, as time will not allow me to do more, I must refer Sir W. James to you for information; and I leave it to your discretion to make any use you may think advisable of the contents of this letter.

From what I have laid before you, it will fully appear that my situation here is likely to become every day more critical. I am sure you will readily lend your assistance to lessening some part of my difficulties, which may be done by dispatching, as soon as possible, that part of Lord M'Leod's regiment which I have already wrote for; and I trust you will be able to have them embarked before your departure.

Affure yourself, my dear Sir, of my best services to the two friends you recommend. As to Tom Law, he really needs no advocate but himself. Mr. Richardson I am not much acquainted with; but, rest satisfied, I will promote his interest as far as lies in my power.

Lady Coote joins me in sincerely wishing to
Lady Rumbold and yourself a prosperous voyage

age and safe arrival in England; and may you
soon recover the health you have lost.

Believe me to be,

With very sincere esteem,

My dear Sir THOMAS's

Affectionate Friend and

Obedient humble Servant,

EYRE COOTE,

Copy

*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B.
to Mr. HASTINGS, dated Allahabad, 19th
December 1779.*

DEAR SIR,

I THIS moment have received your letter of the 9th.—It is true that two days ago I had an intimation given me that Captain Palmer, your Aid de Camp, was coming up here in a public capacity, which I could not possibly give credit to; not only because your letter, inclosing the draft of the proposed treaty with Gohud, did not mention it, but that I could not suppose, while I was so near the spot to effect or assist any public measure, any other channel for its accomplishment could be thought of: and there are many gentlemen of respectable characters here, who could equally well have been dispatched to have the treaty ratified.

The carrying through a measure in this manner, by means of what is in fact *a private agent*, whatever gloss may be put upon the matter, while a member of the Board stands in the situation I do here, destroys not only the consequence and dignity which ought to attend
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every pledge given of public faith, but, with it, all appearances of co-operation between us: and the country powers, as well as our own community, naturally led to judge from outward marks, and not seeing any necessity why a gentleman from your family should travel the distance between Calcutta and Gohud merely for such a purpose, are not scrupulous to give him an object which, I dare say, you little meant he should come under the suspicion of *.

In respect to the treaty itself, I have strong objections to some parts of it; and when I receive it officially from the Board, which I have a right to expect very soon, I shall offer them my remarks upon it; but till then it must rest, as I do not care to take it up from the copy which you have obligingly sent me.

I am,

My dear SIR,

Your very faithful and

obedient humble Servant,

(Signed)

EYRE COOTE.

* *Viz. To watch Sir Eyre Coote.*

Copy

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS to Sir
EYRE COOTE, K. B. dated Fort William,
29th December 1779.*

DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED, by yesterday's post, your letter of the 19th.

It is to be regretted that you suffered the reports of others to influence your judgement and determine your resolutions, before you had given me the opportunity, which I solicited, of explaining to you the design of Captain Palmer's deputation; because you would have known that it had no relation to any subject which could possibly affect your consequence, or afford you the most distant cause of offence. But I fear that you have taken your decided line from the first impression, and must of course, justify and abide by it. The conclusion of your letter too strongly indicates this, and is, in effect, a plain declaration of hostility. What my personal feelings have been on this occasion I will not mention: these have subsided, and given place to very different sensations in the prospect I behold, of a loose, divided,

divided, and distracted Government, assailed at the same time by dangers which require the utmost exertion of all its powers to repel — which is utterly impracticable while those in whose hands they are placed want mutual confidence, and employ them in mutual opposition.

It may be too late to hope for any good effect from an explanation; yet thus far I shall endeavour to remove the grounds of your objections, by assuring you that the real design of Captain Palmer's commission is *totally unconnected with the treaty with the Ranna of Gohud*, and with his interests, and could only be executed by myself, or by an agent fully and intimately instructed both in my views and in all the circumstances on which I ground my expectation of their accomplishment. — As to the form of interchanging the written deed of the treaty, I think I before told you, that this was no object: *in effect, a common chubdar, or even a cossid, might have been instructed with so trivial a ceremonial.* But whatever were the object, it was as little in your power to give your personal attention to it as it was in mine. The difference between our respective distances from the ostensible scene of the commission makes no alteration either in the right of official jurisdiction
or

or in the propriety of my delegating a trust of this kind. I did understand that you looked for no other employment but that which your military charge, a very weighty one, afforded you, nor any political influence beyond the Nabob of Oud, which, from its connection with your immediate department, may be considered as necessary in a great degree to the support of your credit and authority in it. I have promised to support you to the utmost of my power in the possession and exercise of both. I have most faithfully performed that promise, not only by my voice at the Board, but by my personal authority, wherever I have had any call to employ it, and by public declarations of my resolution to the same effect. — You have also given me your promise and frequent repetitions of it, that you will support my authority. The political department is most especially and most essentially mine; If you deny me this, what is my department, or what is that authority to which you have promised your support?

If, in the cooler moments of reflection, you shall have allowed your reason or friendship to dictate a more temperate conduct than that which your letter portends, we may yet unite our endeavours with effect for the public service, which is my only motive in this letter :

if

if not, I have the testimony of my own conscience to acquit me of all blame for the consequences.

Captain Palmer has my orders to attend you in his route, to shew you my instructions, and to receive any additions which you may think it proper to give to him. As I hope he will soon perform this part of his commission, I think it unnecessary to say more concerning it, especially since you have made it necessary to explain it more particularly than I had intended, or than could be done by letter,

I have said that the real design of Captain Palmer's deputation was *totally foreign from the treaty lately concluded with the Ranna of Gobud*; and you will understand the expression to imply that this design was but one. It was indeed first suggested by an application from the Ranna's Minister, that a person might be deputed to see the Ranna ratify the treaty, and (as he said) to view the state of the Ranna and of his country. I accepted the proposal, intending to apply it to a better purpose, which I had before in contemplation; but I had also another, though secondary, view in it, which was to prevent what I had some time foreseen or suspected, the effect of any incendiary artifices

tifices which may have been practised to dis-
unite us. Something like this I intimated in
(I believe) my last letter.

I cannot conclude this letter without expres-
sing my surprise at one suggestion in yours,
which as ill agrees with your professions of the
esteem in which you held my character as it was
most injurious to it. — You can have had no
ground for such an imputation in any past in-
stance of my conduct, and ought to have re-
sented the attempt in any one to fix it on me.
(I should have thought this due to *you* in the
like case.) — I must add, that, were I myself
capable of making a mercenary bargain for the
sale of the Company's alliance, I have too high
an opinion of Captain Palmer's honour to have
tempted him to become the instrument of so
base a traffic.

I have the honour to be,

DEAR SIR,

Your most obedient and

Most humble Servant,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

Note.

Note. *Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations of*
6th December 1779.

“ *Resolved*, That a person be deputed, on
“ the part of this Government, to the Ranna
“ of Gohud, *for the purpose* of seeing the treaty
“ executed, and for exchanging the ratifica-
“ tions.

“ *Governor General*. I move that Captain
“ Palmer, my Military Secretary, may be de-
“ puted to interchange the treaties with the
“ Ranna of Gohud, according to the proposal
“ of the Minister entered in the former part of
“ this day’s consultation.”

Copy

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS, to Sir
EYRE COOTE, K. B. dated Fort William,
3d January, 1780.*

DEAR SIR,

YOUR letter to the Board, with your protest against the treaty lately concluded with the Ranna of Gohud, is arrived. Mr. Barwell has prevailed upon me to keep back the delivery of it until he shall have written to you himself, and received your answer and final resolution concerning it. His motives I applaud, as no less becoming in his public character, than expressive of the zeal and steadiness which influence his friendships; and I yield to him without reluctance, from a conviction, that the end proposed by the delay will completely justify me against any objections of its irregularity. I shall forbear to say any thing concerning the occasion of this intervention, as Mr. Barwell has undertaken it, and shall refer you for a more effectual and equally genuine information of my sentiments to his letter. In the mean time, your public letter shall remain in his hands

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hands, to be disposed of as you shall think it proper to direct.

I have the honour to be,

DEAR SIR,

Your most obedient

And humble servant,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. BARWELL to Sir
EYRE COOTE, K. B. dated Calcutta, 3d
January 1780.*

DEAR SIR EYRE,

THE occasion will, I hope, excuse me, let whatever may prove the result. I was sick and kept my house when your letter of the 21st arrived; I no sooner read it than I invited the Governor to call upon me, in order if possible to prevent, if it was in my power, the consequences which I dreaded might flow from it. I began the conversation by representing to him
the

the mistake under which I conceived your resentment had been excited, and then slightly touching on the cases which might have conducted to it, I dwelt long and pointedly on the great weight and responsibility your military command and rank in the government gave you: the right you had to participate in every measure; the respect, caution, and delicacy, with which you should be treated; and concluded my discourse (an hour long) with a peremptory demand to keep your letter in my possession, and to use my endeavours to conciliate a breach likely to prove irreparable if not immediately healed; that as I was neither deterred by the warmth of your temper, nor by the decided manner in which your dissatisfaction had been expressed, he must give me leave to hope, and to act from that hope.

The obstacle I found most difficult to remove was, the idea, that he might be charged with interrupting your correspondence with the Board: I combated this by observing, that the blame, if any, was mine; that I should not scruple to avow it. It was my part, if I could, to prevent a division between you, &c. &c. I must, in justice to Mr. H. inform you he not only, at my instance, readily left your letter and

minute to my keeping, but expressed himself in the warmest and tenderest manner. He had sought your friendship, he said, and he would not by any act of his break the connection: he should be happy to strengthen it, and wished me success; and this with such expressions, as to convince me he spoke without reserve, and felt my anxiety, at the instant he gave me his permission to do what I might think proper in an affair so delicate and perplexing. I would willingly enter into the subject with more freedom, if I conceived it would answer any good purpose; but, until I am satisfied by your consideration shewn to the request I am about to make (that you can place a dependence on my motive and principle of action) I shall confine myself to my immediate object in addressing you, without pretending to judge between you. I ask it of you as a favour, to moderate your warmth; to forget the cause, whether real or suppositious, that excites it; and to allow me to assure Mr. H. I have prevailed, and that you have consigned all to oblivion, by empowering me to return your letter, and to give him this farther test of your disposition to preserve a connection, which on his part must be equally well supported.

I need

I need not assure you of my unremitted endeavours — the public service as well as personal ties equally and strongly influence me — If they are fruitless, I can only lament the persecution of fortune, in fixing me to a perpetual scene of contest, and lament the division which now unhappily deprives me of every prospect of union in our councils. Upon the receipt of your answer all my hopes depend,

I am,

My dear Sir,

Your friend

And very humble servant,

(Signed)

RICH^d BARWELL.

Copy

*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE to Mr.
HASTINGS, dated Lucknow, 10th January,
1780.*

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE just received your letter of the 29th, and do assure you, that the idea of a divided and enfeebled Government, at a juncture when every nerve should be strained for the public service, gives me all the painful feelings which you can possibly have experienced yourself.

I do most solemnly declare, that I have not, in any one instance, deviated from the promise I gave of supporting you in every measure which appeared to me to be beneficial to our employers. I desired yours upon no other terms for myself; and you may recollect, that, in order to insure such a conciliation of opinion as might best enable us to carry through the operations of Government, we judged it expedient to give mutual information of every intended plan or proposition previous to its coming before the Board. Had this been attended to in the instance before us, by sending to me the treaty with the Ranna of Gohud, as it is now worded,

worded, before it was produced at the Board, you may depend upon it I should have made to you every objection in confidence, which, much to my concern, I was under the necessity of offering publicly, in order to clear myself of a measure which I felt to be destructive in many ways, to our national interest and honour.—I say the treaty as it is now worded; for though in substance it resembles the first paper you communicated to me, yet the terms in which it is clothed alter and extend every article in such a manner, that I no longer see in it the same object. The point was not of such great importance as to have suffered any prejudice by this short delay in its execution; and it would have answered the farther good purpose of enabling me to inform you from the spot, that you had been deceived as well as myself in the ideas we had been led to form of the consequence, revenues, strength, and situation of the Ranna and his territories.

In respect to Captain Palmer's deputation, as the ostensible reason given for it is the ratification of the public faith, I must still feel, that it ought to have gone through a member of the Board, situated where, and as I am at present. The private commission he is charged with I can be no judge of, because I am unacquainted with

with it; though, when you first mentioned the character in which he was to appear, you assured me I should receive from you the full information in another letter. Such a proper and well-timed confidence concerning Captain Palmer's *real mission, and the gloss intended to be thrown over it*, would have put it in my power to represent to you the impropriety of the latter in respect to myself, and to give you at the same time my sentiments upon the former.

I cannot leave this subject without exculpating myself from the idea you have formed in consequence of an expression in my letter. Be assured, Sir, the attributing to you a mercenary motive was the farthest thing in the world from my thoughts: but, seeing the little confidence shewn me in regard to those transactions, I confess I could not help supposing it possible, *that the observation of what passed here might be one point in view.*

I shall not enter into a discussion of the rights affixed to our several departments; suffice it that I know what belongs to me, both in my military capacity, and as a member of the Board; and that I neither wish nor mean to advance a step beyond the strictest limits of either.

And

And allow me again to repeat, that I still continue, as surely you have found me hitherto, most ready to support every measure of Government, which, according to my ideas, I can support with propriety to the public and myself; that it is my sincere wish and desire to preserve the reciprocal confidence which I believed our concern for the good of the service had so established between us, that my absence from the Board could not possibly have lessened it; and that I have, on my part, in every transaction, both here and elsewhere, most exactly and pointedly adhered to it, by giving, on all occasions, every degree of support and consequence to your authority and character. Opposition from me, as I think I have often assured you, is to measures and not to men.

Whether to avow these principles, and to act from them, portends hostile intentions, I leave you to judge; and let your candour also determine, whether the same proceedings, on your part, would not have spared us all trouble, but that of attending to the exigencies of our present critical situation, and endeavouring to preserve uninjured the important stake committed to our charge.

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I mean

I mean to set off to-morrow for Futtý Ghur,
and other stations; and am,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient

Humble servant,

(Signed)

EYRE COOTE.



*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE to Mr.
BARWELL at Calcutta, dated Futtý Ghur,
17th January, 1780.*

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE just received your letter of the
3d instant, as well as one of the same date,
from Mr. Hastings; to which my letter of
the 10th will, I hope, have proved a suffi-
cient

cient answer, and no doubt he will have shewn it you.

In full reply to the different points you state, I most solemnly declare that my protest proceeded from enmity to no man; that it arose from no personal pique whatever; and that, so far from warmth, it was dictated by my coolest determination, unconnected with any party or discordant views, but solely to justify myself in my conduct upon a measure that I cannot join in, without giving up the military trust reposed in me: and in proof of this, if the treaty is altered into such a shape that I can subscribe to, as explained in my last minute, my protest shall fall with that amendment: and I flatter myself that my objections to it must appear so forcible, that there can be little difficulty in this business; in which idea I am more confirmed by your withholding my letter, &c. from the Board.

As to Mr. Hastings seeking my friendship, he did not seek it in vain. This is proved both by my conduct towards him here, and *my representations home*: how far it is worth his while to retain it, he is the best judge: but you must concur with me in opinion, that no friendship whatever ought to debar me from self-justi-

fication, when my duty appears to me to call
for it.

I am,

My dear Sir,

Your very sincere and

Obedient, humble servant,

(Signed)

EYRE COOTE.

Copy.

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS to Lord
MACARTNEY, on the River Ganges, near
Bugle pore, dated 23^d July, 1781.*

RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD MACARTNEY.

MY LORD,

IN the letter which I have already had the honour to address to your Lordship, I expressed my regret that I had not known of your appointment in time to have furnished you with explanations on some particular points, of which I expect that an advantage will have been taken to prejudice your mind with injurious and dangerous opinions of the designs of this Government with relation to yours. From the candour which your Lordship appears to possess, I have no doubt that I should have found it an easy point to satisfy you of the propriety and fairness of our acts, and even of their necessity; but as it has happened, you will have taken your line; and any thing which I can write upon past subjects may arrive too late to produce their effects. I feel the discouragement of this reflection, but shall not yield to it, trusting
that

that you will have had the caution, under whatever impression, to avoid so decided a conduct as may disable you from yielding to the influence of better information, or (which I rather expect) that you will have at once resolved to adopt our principles, and heartily to support and carry the measures formed upon them into effect.

Let me premise that our Government has a weight of business of its own already as great as it can sustain, and a responsibility sufficiently hazardous and delicate in itself to make it dread any addition to it; and, my Lord, I fancy that you have found the affairs of the Carnatic in a state which could afford little temptation to us, were we ever so vacant of employment, to assume a participation in the conduct and events of its administration. This may serve for a general proof, that it was not from choice that we have, in any instance, interfered in the concerns of that province, or of your presidency. I desire your Lordship to look back on the transactions of the last twelvemonth, and weigh, by your own judgment, the many things that we have done for the relief and preservation of Fort St. George. That, which was undeniably good, has been accepted as a rightful claim; the rest, as I am told, either treated with derision, or resented as injurious.

injurious. I allude particularly to the treaty proposed with the Dutch, a measure extorted by the cries of despair, and judged in the elation of a sudden return of success; and to the agreement lately concluded with the Nabob Waula Jaw. To this I shall confine the sequel of this letter.

The letters from the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George, from the beginning of the war with Hyder, have invariably represented the resources of the Carnatic as lost beyond all hope to them, either from the Nabob's inability to collect them, or his determination to withhold them. We expressed it as our firm opinion, that every rupee of the Carnatic ought to be primarily and exclusively applied to its defence; that, as our force alone maintained it, we had a right to demand assignments of the whole revenue, and even to take it if refused. In the mean time they had made the demand, and the Nabob had refused it; but the demand and refusal were in one instance so mysterious that we could not comprehend the latent causes of either. The Circars of Rigole, &c. had been assigned to the Nabob's private creditors; but as they had gained nothing by the assignment, they proposed to transfer it to the Company, on the condition that credit should

should be given them in the Company's name for the receipts ; that these might be employed in the mean time for the expences of the war. The Committee demanded the assignment, but took no notice of the condition, and the Nabob naturally refused it, because he had already granted it to his creditors ; and with this state of the case, both parties referred it to us ; the creditors remonstrating against the mode in which the demand was made, as subjecting the Nabob to a rejection of it, by which all parties must be losers ; and the Committee stating it as a confirmed proof of the Nabob's disaffection.

At the same time the Nabob's Dewan, Ahfam Cawn, and Mr. Richard Sullivan, arrived in Calcutta, charged with a special commission from the Nabob to conclude a treaty with this Government ; of which the first condition, and the first apparent object of their deputation, was, that we would accept an assignment of his revenues, and employ them on the public service ; and this condition was not offered for our benefit, but solicited, as if his interest alone was likely to be promoted by our assent to it.

This was the foundation of the agreement ; and as it promised a most seasonable relief to the Carnatic, which we could not easily afford, having

having already exhausted both our resources and credit in that and other emergent occasions of the Company's affairs, we readily and gladly accepted the offer, guarding it with such provisions as appeared to us necessary to prevent its being defeated, or perverted to other purposes. Your Lordship will not ask, why we thought our intervention on this occasion necessary, and why we did not rather refer the accommodation to the Presidency of Fort St. George, which was the regular instrument of the Company's participation in the government of the Carnatic? But I will suppose the question. I might properly answer it by another, — Why did the Company withdraw their confidence from the same Ministry to bestow it on your Lordship? And, after all, what have we done? For others every thing, for ourselves nothing, — unless it be supposed that we rescued the Nabob from the thralldom, in which he was held by others, to exercise the same lucrative species of oppression on him ourselves; an imputation which I know will be suggested, and the world will be ready to give it credit; but which I should abhor myself, if I thought that any man who knew me would admit but with a moment's hesitation. Had I known that a man of your Lordship's character had been chosen to administer the affairs of that Government, I believe that I should

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have

have persuaded the Nabob to trust his interests in your hands, rather than make such a separation of them from their ancient and more natural connection; and from the moderation of Mr. Wheler's disposition, I think he would have agreed with me in that preferable accommodation; but as it has been made an act of this Government, and its faith pledged in the most sacred manner to the performance of it, it can neither be revoked nor qualified; and I most earnestly conjure your Lordship to give it your firm and hearty support.

The principal articles of this agreement are the 8th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. On these I shall offer a few remarks.

To render the mode of collection prescribed in the 8th and 10th articles effectual, I would recommend that the Commissioners be allowed a commission or percentage, and a liberal one, upon the sums which they shall realize, and no fixed appointments. It is the principle which we have lately adopted, and have applied to every great department of our own Government; and I will venture to answer for its complete success, if you will make the trial of it. If you trust to the integrity of those whom you charge with the unchecked receipts of lacks,
and

and allow them such ostensible salaries as will afford them the bare means of subsistence; they will make up the deficiency by secret perquisites, to which no man ever yet set due bounds. The consequence is inevitable, especially in this remote corner of the world, where men must look to a competency for their latter days. The commission will be an incitement to exertion, and will be a tie on the honour and fidelity of those who receive it; for I am persuaded that the generality of the Company's servants would be better contented with a moderate, but sure, provision by such allowed means, than to be let loose on an unbounded scene of plunder, which must be a source of perpetual reproach and apprehension for the consequences of detection. I beg your Lordship to receive this not as a light recommendation. It is a favourite doctrine, confirmed by many years reflection and experience, although it is but lately that I have had it in my power to apply it. I believe that the same sentiments will appear recorded by myself on your consultations, even at so distant a period as the year 1771.

I can say little upon the subject of Tanjore, for I can hardly allow it the credit of a serious argument. The meanness of our first letters dignified the Rajah with the title of King, and by that

misnomer, if I may call it so, he has acquired all the prerogatives of Royalty, though the Nabob, his undoubted Sovereign, has been without scruple treated as a dependant. If these ridiculous prejudices are allowed to operate against every principle of justice and policy, and (I must add) of common sense, it is a pity that they could not be confined to the season of peace and security. Surely this is not a time to encourage or yield to the delusion — The late President and Select Committee informed us, that the Rajah had refused to contribute a store of grain to the subsistence of the army, for which the President had written to him a letter expressive of his displeasure — This is a language so remote from my conceptions of the actual and absolute rights of your Government, while it is charged with the entire defence of the state of which the Rajah of Tanjore is a member, and of his dependance, that I can scarce offer an opinion, which shall not appear extravagant in the comparison — In a word, I think it improper at such a time, to leave the Rajah an option to withhold a grain of his store, or a rupee of his treasure, from the service of the general state; and most heartily advise, that, while that service, in the present desperate condition of it lasts, the whole, with the single reservation of his own personal subsistence, be taken out of his

his hands in better trust for the public use. These are my public and private sentiments, and your Lordship is welcome to avail yourself of them in any manner you please—most heartily do I wish that they may be conformable to your own.

The Nabob's debt to individuals is become an object of too great magnitude and extent to be treated on the principles on which it might have been proper to judge it in its commencement, as it is grown into a kind of national property, and the fortunes of so many are involved in it, that it will force itself upon the protection of the public, if some expedient be not found to put the claims of the creditors on some footing on which they can rely for their recovery.

At the same time, if they are allowed to grow with the yearly accumulation of the present interest, or even the principal to remain at its actual amount, the manifest impossibility of its being ever discharged, or even diminished, will be a discouragement to every attempt to effect either.

It was with an equal regard to these united considerations, that we recommended the plan
of

of adjustment and liquidation which is described in the 11th article of the agreement. Mr. Richard Sullivan, who professed to know the sentiments of the creditors, assured me, that, instead of repining at the retrenchments which we have proposed, they would be thankful for the provision which was left them, having had little ground to hope for any payments. I express my hopes upon this subject with the greater confidence of their meeting your judgment, from a communication which has been lately made me by Mr. Stephen Sullivan, of a letter written by his father to your Lordship, in which he recommends a plan for the liquidation of the Nabob's debt, on exactly the same principles as that of ours, but differing in the application only by the difference, which was rendered necessary by the alteration made in the state of affairs since his letter was written.

The reason of the 12th article is self evident : It may also appear unnecessary; for surely the past experience of the insecurity of the Nabob's credit would be sufficient of itself to prevent any one hereafter from trusting to it. But this will be forgotten when the danger is past, *and even the remedy will be a lure to new adventurers.*

I shall

I shall not make excuses for the length of this letter. It will cost your Lordship less time to read it than I have spent in writing it; and you will receive it as a proof of the value which I set on your Lordship's concurrence in my line of thinking, by the pains which I have taken to gain it. You will have heard, that I have subjected myself to reproach for the deficiencies of my private correspondence, and as much as I wish to avoid that imputation with your Lordship, I am afraid that occasions will happen to draw it upon me, and I thus early bespeak your indulgence if ever this shall prove the case. I am at this time happily furnished with unusual leisure, and have gratified my own inclinations, and performed, I hope, not an unacceptable service to your Lordship in this employment of it.

I beg leave to conclude this letter and the general subject of it, with a recommendation of Mr. Richard Sullivan to your protection and countenance; you will find him deeply and minutely informed in the Nabob's affairs; of pleasing manners, and, if you shall think it proper to make use of his services, possessed of honourable and faithful principles.

I left

I left Calcutta on the 12th instant, and hope to reach Benares by the middle of next month: I shall proceed to Lucknow, and shall expect to return to Calcutta before the end of October, if no very urgent cause detains me, which I do not apprehend beyond that period.

I shall continue to write to your Lordship upon other important subjects — In the mean time I beg that you will believe me to be with a real esteem,

My LORD,

Your most obedient,

And most faithful servant,

(Signed)

WARREN HASTINGS.



THE END.